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Abstract
In the setting where participants are asked multiple similar possibly subjective multi-choice
questions (e.g. Do you like Panda Express? Y/N; do you like Chick-fil-A? Y/N), a series
of peer prediction mechanisms are designed to incentivize honest reports and some of them
achieve dominantly truthfulness : truth-telling is a dominant strategy and strictly dominate other
“non-permutation strategy” with some mild conditions. However, a major issue hinders the
practical usage of those mechanisms: they require the participants to perform an infinite number
of tasks. When the participants perform a finite number of tasks, these mechanisms only achieve
approximated dominant truthfulness. The existence of a dominantly truthful multi-task peer
prediction mechanism that only requires a finite number of tasks remains to be an open question
that may have a negative result, even with full prior knowledge.
This paper answers this open question by proposing a new mechanism, Determinant based
Mutual Information Mechanism (DMI-Mechanism), that is dominantly truthful when the number
of tasks is ≥ 2C. C is the number of choices for each question (C = 2 for binary-choice questions).
DMI-Mechanism also pays truth-telling higher than any strategy profile and strictly higher than
uninformative strategy profiles (informed truthfulness). In addition to the truthfulness properties,
DMI-Mechanism is also easy to implement since it does not require any prior knowledge (detail-
free) and only requires ≥ 2 participants. The core of DMI-Mechanism is a novel information
measure, Determinant based Mutual Information (DMI). DMI generalizes Shannon’s mutual
information and the square of DMI has a simple unbiased estimator. In addition to incentivizing
honest reports, DMI-Mechanism can also be transferred into an information evaluation rule that
identifies high-quality information without verification when there are ≥ 3 participants.
To the best of our knowledge, DMI-Mechanism is both the first detail-free informed-truthful
mechanism and the first dominantly truthful mechanism that works for a finite number of tasks,
not to say a small constant number of tasks.
1 Introduction
Eliciting information is common in today’s world (e.g. restaurants rating, movie rating) and the
elicited information can affect people’s life after being fed into algorithms (e.g. recommendation
algorithms). However, the overwhelming number of elicitation requests may lead to unrepresentative
feedbacks. The naive flat-payment reward, paying every participator one dollar regardless of her
feedback, may distort people’s incentives: some people may answer a large number of questions
simply for the reward without making any attempt to answer accurately. In this case, two questions
arise:
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• Information Elicitation: how to encourage high-quality, honest information?
• Information Evaluation: how to identify high-quality information?
These two questions face the same crucial challenge: the information may not be verifiable, as the
information can be subjective or the gold-standard/ground truth is hard to access. With this challenge,
spot-checking, i.e. verifying the answer with some probability, is impossible to implement. The
traditional majority vote rule discourages the honest feedback and fails to identify the high-quality
information from the minority.
To this end, peer prediction mechanisms arise to address this challenge. The general idea of
peer prediction is to reward each person a clever similarity measure between her report and her
peer’s report such that honest strategy, i.e., truth-telling, is preferred in some solution concepts
(e.g. truth-telling is a strict Nash equilibrium which means for each participator, given other people
tell the truth, it’s strictly better for her to tell the truth as well, even she belongs to the minority).
Moreover, every peer prediction mechanism can be transferred into an information evaluation rule
that does not need ground truth: scoring each participant’s information based on her payment, since
intuitively, in expectation, high-quality information should have high payment to be encouraged.
The multi-task setting, where participants are asked several similar multi-choice questions (e.g.
Do you like Panda Express? Y/N; do you like Chick-fil-A? Y/N), is one of the common settings
for peer prediction mechanisms. Although the multi-task setting asks the participants to perform
multiple tasks, it has several advantages over the single-task setting. For example, unlike the
single-task mechanisms, the multi-task mechanisms can be minimal in the sense that the participants
do not need to report their forecasts for other people. Moreover, in the multi-task setting, the
single-task setting’s common prior assumption is unnecessary: the participants can share different
prior knowledge for the tasks and be heterogeneous. We want the multi-task mechanisms to be
• dominantly truthful : truth-telling is a dominant strategy and strictly dominates other “non-
permutation strategy”1 with some mild conditions;
• informed-truthful : truth-telling is an equilibrium and moreover, truth-telling is the best2
strategy profile and strictly better than uninformative strategy profiles, where everyone’s report
is independent of her honest answer;
• detail-free: the implementation of the mechanism does not require any prior knowledge;
• practical : the mechanism works for a small number of tasks and a small number of participants.
In the multi-task setting mechanisms, designing truthful mechanisms that works for a small
number of participants properties is not hard. However, it’s quite difficult to design truthful
mechanisms with a small number of tasks and the current state-of-the-art requires participants to
perform an infinite number of tasks to achieve informed/dominant truthfulness, which is certainly
not practical. In detail, for the informed truthfulness, to reduce the number of tasks, either some
prior knowledge is needed (not detail-free) or the truthfulness goal is replaced by its approximated
version3. For the dominant truthfulness, the current state-of-the-art requires an infinite number of
1Permutation strategy means always reporting a permuted version of the answer, e.g. say “like” when the honest
answer is “dislike” while say “dislike” when the honest answer is “like”.
2The “best” strategy profile has the highest amount of expected payment for every participant.
3(, δ)-informed truthfulness: truth-telling is at least  better than other strategy profiles, with 1 − δ probability.
2
tasks even with full prior knowledge. The mechanisms that work for a finite number of tasks only
have an approximated dominant truthfulness4.
The key issue faced by the previous works is the need to learn the information structures
among the participants. For example, when the participants have similar tastes, the mechanism
should pay them for agreements. When the participants have opposite tastes, the mechanism
should pay them for disagreements. When the participants’ tastes have complicated information
structures, the mechanism should pay them for “clever” (dis)agreements. To learn the information
structure, the mechanism needs sufficient amount of tasks. To this end, the existence of a detail-free
dominantly/informed-truthful mechanism even with a finite number of tasks remains to be an open
question that may have a negative result. This work gives a positive answer to this open question by
proposing a new mechanism. Unlike the previous mechanisms, this new mechanism does not have
the learning issue since its implementation is independent of the information structure knowledge.
Main contribution This work considers both the information elicitation and the information
evaluation questions, focuses on the multi-task setting and provides
• Information Elicitation: a dominantly truthful, informed-truthful, detail-free and practical
multi-task mechanism, Determinant based Mutual Information Mechanism (DMI-Mechanism),
which works for ≥ 2 participants and ≥ 2C tasks (Theorem 5.1);
• Information Evaluation: a multi-task information evaluation rule which is based on DMI-
Mechanism. This scoring rule assigns high-quality information a higher score in expectation
(Theorem 6.4). A concentration bound analysis for the scores is also provided (Section 6.1).
To the best of our knowledge, DMI-Mechanism is both the first detail-free informed-truthful and
the first detail-free dominantly truthful mechanism that works for a finite number of tasks, not to
say a constant number of tasks.
Main technical contribution The core of DMI-Mechanism is a novel matrix determinant based
information measure, DMI (Section 4). Like Shannon’s mutual information (MI), DMI is non-negative,
symmetric and information-monotone. DMI also has two additional desirable properties that MI
does not have: DMI’s unbiased estimator is easy to be constructed due to the polynomial format5
of the determinant and DMI has a special relative invariance property due to the multiplicative
property of the determinant. The first property allows DMI-Mechanism to be dominantly truthful
with a constant number of tasks and the second property allows DMI-Mechanism based scoring rule
to assign a higher score to high-quality information in expectation.
1.1 Roadmap
This paper first focuses on the information elicitation. Section 3 introduces the formal setting
for information elicitation without verification in the multi-task setting. Section 4 introduces the
definition and the properties of the main technical ingredient, DMI. Section 5 presents the DMI-
Mechanism and the main result for information elicitation (Theorem 5.1). Section 6 starts to
4(, δ)-dominant truthfulness: truth-telling is at least  better than other strategies, with 1 − δ probability.
5Without the information structure knowledge, the information measures used in previous works [8, 17, 9] do not
have a polynomial format. This is the main technical reason that they need an infinite number of tasks.
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introduce the problem of information evaluation without verification and then presents the main
result for information evaluation (Theorem 6.4). Section 7 concludes the paper and discusses possible
future directions.
2 Related work
Since the seminal work of Miller et al. [10], several works focus on designing information elicitation
mechanisms without verification, i.e., peer prediction. Two main settings are concerned: single-task
setting and multi-task setting. In the single-task setting, participants are asked to answer only
a single question. The multi-task setting asks the participants to answer several a priori similar
questions. Thus, in some sense, the multi-task setting has a stronger assumption than the single-task
setting. However, the multi-task setting’s mechanisms are usually minimal, which is possibly more
practical than the non-minimal single-task mechanisms. Moreover, the current state-of-the-art
mechanism in the single-task setting is only informed-truthful while there exist dominantly truthful
mechanisms in the multi-task setting. We will classify the related works into these two settings. This
section will first focus on the classic setting where each task is simply a multi-choice question and
each participant receives a single private answer for each task. We will talk about other models later.
Single-task The original peer prediction work [10] designs the first single-task peer prediction
mechanism where truth-telling is a strict equilibrium. However, their mechanism requires the
prior knowledge. Prelec [11] designs the first single-task detail-free peer prediction mechanism,
Bayesian Truth Serum (BTS). However, BTS requires the number of participants to be infinite and
is non-minimal, in the sense that participants are additionally asked to forecast their peers’ answers
(e.g. what percentage of your peers will answer “yes” for this question?). A series of works (e.g.
[13, 2, 18]) focus on removing the infinite-participants assumption of BTS but are still non-minimal.
Kong and Schoenebeck [5] propose a detail-free mechanism which only requires a small number of
participants (in fact, ≥ 6) and pays truth-telling better than any other symmetric equilibrium. For
the information evaluation, Prelec et al. [12] apply BTS to recover ground truth when the majority
can be wrong sometimes. Unlike these works, this paper focuses on the minimal multi-task setting.
Multi-task Table 2 compares the multi-task peer prediction mechanisms for the number of tasks
needed to achieve the (approximated) truthfulness. Dasgupta and Ghosh [1] propose the first
multi-task peer prediction mechanism. Their mechanism is informed-truthful and requires only ≥ 2
questions. However, their mechanism only works for binary-choice questions and assumes that all
participants’ honest answers are positively correlated, which put a limitation on the prior. Correlated
Agreement (CA) mechanism [17] extends Dasgupta and Ghosh [1] to a non-binary setting. CA
also removes the limitation on the prior. But to be informed-truthful with only a small number
of questions, CA requires some prior knowledge and is not detail-free. A detail-free version of CA
achieves informed truthfulness with an infinite number of questions and approximated informed
truthfulness with a finite number of questions (Table 2). Although the original paper did not claim,
the detail-free version of CA is also dominantly truthful with an infinite number of questions. Kong
and Schoenebeck [8] independently achieve the dominant truthfulness with an infinite number of
questions and propose an information-theoretic approach. Kamble et al. [4] propose a mechanism
where each participant can perform only one task. However, this mechanism still requires the total
number of tasks to be large. Moreover, this mechanism has a weak truthfulness property: truth-telling
is an equilibrium that is only better than any symmetric equilibrium where all participants perform
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the same strategy. In their mechanism, each participant can perform one task but the number of
tasks performed by all participants should still be large. Liu and Chen [9] borrow ideas from the
machine learning literature on learning with noisy data and also propose a dominantly truthful
mechanism. They then apply their mechanism to evaluate the information quality and recover the
unknown ground truth, in the setting where the ground truth exists. Liu and Chen [9]’s mechanism
requires a large number of tasks, and some prior knowledge (Table 2). The evaluation rule in Liu and
Chen [9] has different properties from the current paper’s. Schoenebeck and Yu [14] show how to
reduce the mechanism design problem of peer prediction to a learning problem which can be solved
using empirical risk minimization. This enables them to reduce the task complexity significantly
in their setting. Their techniques also extend to settings with continuous signals where the prior
is a parametric distribution. However, unlike the current paper, they only obtain approximated
truthfulness, and, in fact, they show this is a necessary limitation of their technique.
To the best of our knowledge, this paper proposes a mechanism, DMI-Mechanism, which is both
the first detail-free informed-truthful and the first detail-free dominantly truthful mechanism that
requires a finite number of tasks, not to say a constant number of tasks.
(, δ)-/(0,0)-Informed-Truthful (, δ)-/(0,0)-Dominantly Truthful
DG 2013 [1] 2 N/A(Binary-choice, limited priors)
CA Mechanism [17]6 O(− log δ
2
)/Infinite (N/A)/Infinite
f -Mutual Information [8] (N/A)/Infinite (N/A)/InfiniteMechanism
Dominant Truthful Serum [9] N/A O(− log δ
2
)/Infinite(Non-detail-free)
DMI-Mechanism 2C 2C
Table 1: A Task Sample Complexity Comparison of Multi-task Peer Prediction
Other models Kong and Schoenebeck [7] consider the setting where the mechanism elicits the
forecasts from the crowds and each task is a forecast elicitation question (e.g. what is the probability
that this start-up will succeed?). In the multi-task version of this setting, Kong and Schoenebeck [7]
propose an informed-truthful mechanism. Gao et al. [3] propose a setting where spurious “cheap
signals” exist (e.g. the participants collude to answer the first letter of the question, without reading
the question). Kong and Schoenebeck [6] deal with this setting by making an additional assumption,
more sophisticated agents know the beliefs of less sophisticated agents.
3 Mechanism Design for Multi-task Peer Prediction
Basic Notations For integer C > 0, we use [C] to denote {1,2,⋯,C} and define C ∶= [C]. ∆C
is the set of all distributions over C. pi ∶ C ↦ C is a permutation over C if for every c, c′ ∈ C, c ≠ c′,
pi(c) ≠ pi(c′). For every C ×C matrix A, det(A) represents A’s determinant; per(A) represents A’s
6A non-detail-free version of CA also achieves informed truthfulness with 2 questions. Moreover, although the
original paper of CA [17] does not claim the dominant truthfulness, its detail-free version is dominantly truthful.
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permanent. A C ×C matrix A is a transition matrix if all entries of A is in [0,1] and every row of
A sums to 1. A C ×C matrix A is a permutation matrix if there exists a permutation pi ∶ C ↦ C
such that A(c, pi(c)) = 1,∀c and all other entries are zero.
In this section, we will introduce the multi-task peer prediction setting as well as the definition
for multi-task peer prediction mechanisms. We will also introduce the formal definitions of strategy,
truth-telling, permutation strategy and informed truthfulness, dominant truthfulness in the multi-task
setting.
Multi-task Information Elicitation There are n ≥ 2 agents. Each agent will be assigned T
tasks, in fact, T multi-choice questions with the choice space C = [C] where C is the number of
choices (e.g. for binary-choice question, C = {1, 2}). For each task t, each agent i will receive a private
signal cti ∈ C. All agents’ private signals for task t are drawn from an unknown prior distribution
U t[n] ∈ ∆Cn . Before receiving task t, by denoting the unknown private signals agents will receive for
task t via random variables Xt1,X
t
2,⋯,Xtn, we have
Pr[Xt1 = ct1,Xt2 = ct2,⋯,Xtn = ctn] = U t[n](ct1, ct2,⋯, ctn).
Although for the same task, agents’ private signals are correlated, the tasks are independent of
each other, that is, (X1i )i, (X2i )i, ..., (XTi )i are independent.
The information elicitation part’s analysis focuses on the setting where agents do not need to
invest efforts to obtain the private signals (e.g. restaurant reviews). The mechanism can still be
applied to the setting that considers effort, while the effort setting will have a different solution
concept (for example, the dominant truthfulness will be redefined since it’s impossible to incentivize
effort when other people do not invest any effort).
Assumption 3.1 (A priori similar tasks). We assume that there exists an unknown prior distribution
U[n] ∈ ∆Cn such that U t[n] = U[n],∀t.
This assumption assumes that all tasks look similar before receiving them. With this assumption,{(ct1, ct2,⋯, ctn)}Tt=1 can be seen as i.i.d. samples that are drawn from U[n] and we can remove the
superscript t and use random variables X1,X2,⋯,Xn to denote the unknown private signals agents
will receive for every task t.
Unlike the single-task peer prediction setting where the common prior and the homogeneous
prior assumption are commonly assumed [10, 11], in the multi-task setting, we allow agents to
believe different priors (no common prior assumption) as long as all agents know that the tasks are
a priori similar. For example, agent i can think the prior is U ′[n] and agent j can think the prior is
U ′′[n], where U ′[n] may not equal U ′′[n]. Moreover U[n] is allowed to be asymmetric (heterogeneous
priors are allowed). For example, in the two agents setting, it’s fine that U[2](yes,no) may not equal
U[2](no,yes).
Multi-task Peer Prediction Mechanism A multi-task peer prediction mechanism will ask
agents to report their private signals for T tasks and collect their reports {(cˆt1, cˆt2,⋯, cˆtn)}Tt=1 and pay
each agent based on the collected reports. Formally,
Definition 3.2 (Mechanism). We define a multi-task peer prediction mechanismM as a mappingM ∶(Cn)T ↦ Rn that maps from agents’ reports {(cˆt1, cˆt2,⋯, cˆtn)}Tt=1 to agents’ payments (p1, p2, ..., pn).
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Agents may not tell the truth and perform some strategies such that {(cˆt1, cˆt2,⋯, cˆtn)}Tt=1 is not
always equal to {(ct1, ct2,⋯, ctn)}Tt=1. Typically, the strategy of each agent should be a mapping from
her received knowledge including her prior and her private signal, to a probability distribution over
her report space C. But since all agents’ priors are fixed when they play the mechanism, without
loss of generality, we omit the prior in the definition of strategy.
Definition 3.3 (Strategy). Given a multi-task peer prediction mechanism M, we define each agent
i’s strategy for each task t as a Sti ∶ C ∶↦ ∆C such that given agent i receives private cti, she will
randomly draw a signal cˆti according to the distribution S
t
i(cti).
Every strategy Sti corresponds to a C ×C transition matrix Sti where Sti(cti, cˆti) is the probability
that agent i reports cˆti given that she receives private signal c
t
i. Agent i plays a truthful strategy
if for every task t, Sti is an identity matrix. Agent i plays a permutation strategy if there exists a
permutation matrix P such that for every task t, Sti = P. Truthful strategy is also a permutation
strategy.
Recall that we use random variables X1,X2,⋯,Xn to denote the private signals agents will
receive for every task t. We omit the superscript t due to the a priori similar tasks assumption. For
each task t, we use Xˆt1, Xˆ
t
2,⋯, Xˆtn to denote the signals agents will report for task t. The distribution
of Xˆt1, Xˆ
t
2,⋯, Xˆtn depends not only on the distribution of X1,X2,⋯,Xn but also on agents’ strategies.
We will remove the superscript t with the following assumption.
Assumption 3.4 (Consistent strategy). We assume every agent i plays the same strategy Si for all
tasks.
This assumption is reasonable when agents receive tasks in independent random orders. Shnayder
et al. [17] show that the above assumption can be removed when the mechanism is linear in the
joint distribution over agents’ reports. However, the mechanism designed in this paper is not linear.
Thus, the consistent strategy assumption is assumed here. With this assumption, we can use
Xˆ1, Xˆ2,⋯, Xˆn to denote the signals agents will report for every task t. We define a strategy profile S
as (S1, S2,⋯, Sn).
A Bayesian Nash equilibrium consists of a strategy profile S such that no agent wishes to change
her strategy since other strategies will decrease her expected payment, given the strategies of the
other agents and the information contained in her prior.
We start to present the mechanism design goals. We first define informative peer. Informally,
two agents are informative peers if their private signals are “strictly correlated”.
Definition 3.5 (Informative peer). Agent i and agent j are each other’s informative peer if
det(UXi,Xj) ≠ 0, where UXi,Xj denotes the prior distribution over Xi and Xj. UXi,Xj is the
matrix format of UXi,Xj .
The first design goal is to incentivize the rational agents to participate in the game, with some
mild conditions. We then formally define the informed truthfulness and the dominant truthfulness.
Definition 3.6 (Individual rationality). A mechanism is individually rational if each agent’s expected
payment is strictly positive if she tells the truth and at least one of her informative peers participates
and tells the truth.
Definition 3.7 (Informed truthfulness). A mechanism M is informed-truthful if the strategy profile
where everyone playing truthfully 1) is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium; and 2) pays everyone higher
than any non-truthful strategy profile and when each agent has at least one informative peer, pays
everyone strictly higher than any uninformative strategy profile where Xˆ1, Xˆ2,⋯, Xˆn are independent.
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Definition 3.8 (Dominant truthfulness). A mechanism M is dominantly truthful if 1) for every
agent, truthful strategy maximizes her expected payment no matter what strategies other agents play;
and 2) if she believes at least one of her informative peers will tell the truth, then truthful strategy
pays her strictly higher than any non-permutation strategy.
The naive flat-payment mechanism is not informed-truthful nor dominantly truthful since it
does not satisfy the second requirement of both definitions. A mechanism is dominantly truthful
does not mean that it is informed-truthful. In a dominantly truthful mechanism, truth-telling is an
equilibrium but may not be the best strategy profile (see Kong and Schoenebeck [8] for a concrete
counterexample). Thus, dominant truthfulness does not dominate informed truthfulness. The next
section will show that DMI-Mechanism is not only dominantly truthful but also informed-truthful.
4 Determinant based Mutual Information
This section introduces the main technical ingredient, a novel information measure, Determinant
based Mutual Information (DMI). DMI is a generalization of Shannon’s mutual information. Like
Shannon mutual information (MI) [16], DMI is non-negative, symmetric and also satisfies data
processing inequality. In the next section, we will see it’s easy to construct an unbiased estimator
of the square of DMI with a constant number of samples, which is different from MI who has a
log function in the formula. This is why that we can use DMI to construct a dominantly truthful
mechanism that works for a constant number of tasks.
For two random variables X,Y which have the same support C, we use UX,Y to denote the joint
distribution over X and Y , i.e.,
UX,Y (x, y) = Pr[X = x,Y = y].
We use UY ∣X to denote the transition distribution between X and Y , i.e.
UY ∣X(x, y) = Pr[Y = y∣X = x].
We use UX,Y and UY ∣X to denote the C ×C matrix format of UX,Y and UY ∣X .
Definition 4.1 (DMI). Given two random variables X,Y which have the same support C, we define
the determinant mutual information between X and Y as
DMI(X;Y ) = ∣det(UX,Y )∣.
When both X and Y are binary (0 or 1), by simple calculations, |DMI(X;Y)| is proportional to
the classic correlation formula ∣EXY −EXEY ∣. For non-binary variables, DMI(X;Y) gives a new
information measure.
Lemma 4.2. DMI(⋅; ⋅) satisfies
Symmetry DMI(X;Y ) = DMI(Y ;X);
Non-negativity and boundedness for all X and Y , DMI(X;Y ) is in [0, ( 1C )C] and when X is
independent of Y , DMI(X;Y ) = 0;
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(Strict) Information-Monotonicity for every two random variables X,Y which have the same
support C, when X ′ is less informative than X, i.e., X ′ is independent of Y conditioning X,
DMI(X ′;Y ) ≤ DMI(X;Y ). The inequality is strict when det(UX,Y ) ≠ 0 and UX′∣X is not a
permutation matrix.
Relatively Invariance in the above setting, DMI(X ′;Y ) = DMI(X;Y )∣det(UX′∣X)∣.
Proof. DMI is symmetric since det(A⊺) = det(A). DMI is non-negative since it is defined as the
absolute value of the joint distribution matrix’s determinant and when X and Y are independent,
UX,Y is rank one thus it has zero determinant.
We start to show the relative invariance and the information-monotonicity. Note that when X ′
is independent of Y conditioning X,
UX′,Y (x′, y) = Pr[X ′ = x′, Y = y] =∑
x
Pr[X ′ = x′∣X = x]Pr[X = x,Y = y].
Thus, UX′,Y =UX′∣XUX,Y . Then
DMI(X ′;Y ) =∣det(UX′,Y )∣=∣det(UX′∣XUX,Y )∣ (UX′,Y =UX′∣XUX,Y )=DMI(X;Y )∣det(UX′∣X)∣ (det(AB) = det(A)det(B))≤DMI(X;Y )
The above formula shows the relative invariance and the information-monotonicity. The last inequality
holds since for every square transition matrix T, ∣det(T)∣ ≤ 1 and the equality holds if and only if T
is a permutation matrix (Fact A.1 [15])7. Thus, the inequality is strict when det(UX,Y ) ≠ 0 and
UX′∣X is not a permutation matrix.
Finally, we show that DMI(X;Y ) is bounded by ( 1C )C for all X and Y .
DMI(X;Y ) =∣det(UX,Y )∣=∣det(UX ∣YUY,Y )∣≤∣det(UY,Y )∣ ≤ ( 1
C
)C
5 DMI-Mechanism
The original idea of peer prediction [10] is based on a clever insight: every agent’s information is
related to her peers’ information and therefore can be checked using her peers’ information. Inspired
by this, Kong and Schoenebeck [8] propose a natural yet powerful information-theoretic mechanism
design idea—paying every agent the “mutual information” between her reported information and her
peer’s reported information where the “mutual information” should be information-monotone—any
“data processing” on the two random variables will decrease the “mutual information” between
7Appendix A also presents a direct and basic proof for this fact as a reference.
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them. As we assume the agents want to maximize their payments in expectation, it’s sufficient
to design mechanisms such that the payment in the mechanism is an unbiased estimator of the
information-monotone measure.
However, the unbiased estimator of information-monotone measure used in Kong and Schoenebeck
[8], f -mutual information and Bregman-mutual information, cannot be constructed with a constant
number of samples. The main technical reason is that those measures do not have a polynomial
format. Unlike the previous measures, DMI’s square has a polynomial format such that its unbiased
estimator can be constructed with a constant number of samples, in fact, 2C samples. With this
nice property of DMI, we propose a novel mechanism, DMI-Mechanism, based on DMI such that
DMI-Mechanism is dominantly truthful with only a constant number of tasks.
Figure 1: The illustration of the DMI-Mechanism: we use binary-choice questions to illustrate the
mechanism, while this mechanism works for general multi-choice questions. The leftmost part is agent
i and agent j’s answers for T = 11 binary-choice questions. The T questions are divided into two parts,
T1 and T2. Each T` corresponds to a 2 × 2 matrix Mij` such that for each (c, c′) ∈ {0,1}2, Mij` (c, c′)
counts the number of tasks in T` that agent i answers c and agent j answers c′. With these two
matrices, agent j’s contribution to agent i’s payment is defined as detMij1 detM
ij
2 = −6 × (−4) = 24.
In this running example, agent i and agent j’s answers are actually negatively correlated such that
both detMij1 and detM
ij
2 are negative, while detM
ij
1 detM
ij
2 is still positive. Thus, when agent i
and agent j’s true answers are negatively correlated, for agent i, truth-telling is still not worse than
permuting her answers to match agent j in DMI-Mechanism.
DMI-Mechanism n agents are assigned T ≥ 2C a priori similar tasks in independent random
orders. Agents finish the tasks without any communication.
Report For each task t, each agent i privately receives cti and reports cˆ
t
i.
Payment T tasks are arbitrarily divided into two disjoint parts T1, T2 such that both ∣T1∣, ∣T2∣ ≥ C.
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For every two agents i ≠ j ∈ [n], we define two C × C answer matrices Mij1 ,Mij2 where for
` = 1,2
Mij` (c, c′) ∶= ∑
t∈T` 1 ((cˆti, cˆtj) = (c, c′))
Agent i’s payment is
pi ∶= ∑
j≠i∈[n]det(Mij1 )det(Mij2 )
Normalization of DMI-mechanism In the above definition of DMI-mechanism, the payment
depends on the number of participants and the number of tasks, which may induce unbounded
payments. This issue can be addressed by normalizing the payments:
qi = norm(pi) ∶= pi(n − 1) ∗ (C!)2(∣T1∣C )(∣T2∣C ) .
The following theorem will show that the normalized payment is in [0, ( 1C )C] in expectation. Since
any linear transformation api + b, a > 0, b ≥ 0 on the payments will not change the truthful and
rational properties, the normalized DMI-mechanism will also be detail-free, minimal, individually
rational, informed-truthful and dominantly truthful.
Theorem 5.1 (Main Theorem). When n ≥ 2 and T ≥ 2C, DMI-Mechanism is detail-free, minimal,
individually rational, informed truthful, and dominantly truthful. In the normalized DMI-mechanism,
every participant’s expected payment is in [0, ( 1C )C].
Note that 1T`M
ij
` (c, c′) is an unbiased estimator of Pr[Xˆi = c, Xˆj = c′] (see preliminaries for the
definition of Xˆi, Xˆj). Thus, a naive thought would be to show that ( 1T` )C det(Mij` ) is an unbiased
estimator of det(UXˆi,Xˆj), where UXˆi,Xˆj is the joint distribution over Xˆi, Xˆj . However, since the
entries of Mij` are not independent, the naive thought is not valid. Luckily, by carefully analyzing the
correlation among the entries of Mij` and writing down the explicit formula of determinant, we will
see det(Mij` ) can be written as a sum of indicator variables and each indicator variable corresponds
C ordered distinct tasks in T`. With this observation, the native thought is true by replacing the
constant ( 1T` )C by one over the number of ordered C distinct tasks (in fact, 1(∣T` ∣
C
)C!). Moreover, this
observation also implies that every ∣T`∣ must be greater than C to have at least C distinct tasks such
that the expected payment can be non-zero.
Proof. With the assumption that that DMI-Mechanism assign a priori similar tasks (Assumption 3.1)
and agents play consistent strategies (Assumption 3.4), we can use Xˆ1, Xˆ2,⋯, Xˆn to denote the
signals agents will report for every task and {(cˆt1, cˆt2,⋯, cˆtn)}Tt=1 are T i.i.d. samples of Xˆ1, Xˆ2,⋯, Xˆn.
We first claim that:
Claim 5.2. The expected det(Mij` ) is proportional to det(UXˆi,Xˆj), that is, there exists a constant
a` such that det(Mij` ) = a` det(UXˆi,Xˆj). In fact, a` = (∣T`∣C )C!.
Recall that the reports are i.i.d. samples. Then det(Mij1 ) and det(Mij2 ) are independent, since
they are related to two distinct sets of tasks. Thus, with the above claim, the expected payment of
agent i will be
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∑
j≠ia1a2DMI2(Xˆi; Xˆj).
This implies that the normalized payment is in [0, ( 1C )C] in expectation. Note that agents finish
the tasks without communication, which implies that agents play strategies independently. Thus,
Xˆi is less informative than Xi, i.e., conditioning on Xi, Xˆi is independent of other agents’ reports.
Therefore, due to the information-monotonicity of DMI,
∑
j≠ia1a2DMI2(Xˆi; Xˆj) ≤∑j≠ia1a2DMI2(Xi; Xˆj)≤DMI2(Xi;Xj)
The first inequality shows that truth-telling is a dominant strategy, which also implies that
everyone playing truthfully is an equilibrium. The second inequality shows that everyone playing
truthfully pays everyone better than any non-truthful strategy profile. It’s left to prove the strictness
conditions.
When one of agent i’s informative peers, call him agent j, reports truthfully and agent i plays a
non-permutation strategy, we have
DMI2(Xˆi; Xˆj) =DMI2(Xˆi;Xj)<DMI2(Xi;Xj)=DMI2(Xi; Xˆj)
The strict inequality follows from the strict information-monotonicity of DMI. This shows that
DMI-Mechanism satisfies the strictness condition of dominant truthfulness. For the strictness
condition of informed truthfulness, due to the non-negativity of DMI, each agent’s expected payment
is zero in all uninformative strategy profiles and for each agent i, if she plays truthfully and one of
her informative peers plays truthfully as well, agent i’s expected payment will be strictly positive.
Therefore, DMI-Mechanism is individually rational, dominantly truthful and informed truthful. It
remains to show the above claim.
We define Iijt (c, c′) ∶= 1 ((cˆti, cˆtj) = (c, c′)) as an indicator random variable that indicates whether
agent i and agent j’s answers for task t is (c, c′).
det(Mij` )=∑
pi
sgn(pi)∏
c∈CM
ij
` (c, pi(c))
=∑
pi
sgn(pi)∏
c∈C ∑t∈T` Iijt (c, pi(c))=∑
pi
sgn(pi)∏
c∈C ∑tc∈T` Iijtc (c, pi(c))=∑
pi
sgn(pi) ∑
t1∈T`⋯ ∑tc∈T`⋯ ∑tC∈T`∏c Iijtc (c, pi(c))=∑
pi
sgn(pi) ∑(t1,⋯,tc,⋯,tC)∈TC` ∏c Iijtc (c, pi(c))
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It’s sufficient to only consider distinct tasks. We use t` = (t`(1), t`(2),⋯, t`(C)) to denote ordered
C distinct tasks in T` and I
ij
t`
(pi) ∶= ΠcIijt`(c)(c, pi(c)). Note that for indistinct (t1,⋯, tc,⋯, tC), e.g.
t1 = t2, one of Iijt1(1, pi(1)) and Iijt2(2, pi(2)) must be zero. Thus,
det(Mij` ) =∑
pi
sgn(pi)∑
t`
Iijt`(pi)
We use bpi to denote the expectation of I
ij
t`
(pi), then since distinct tasks are independent,
bpi ∶=EXˆi,XˆjIijt`(pi)=EXˆi,XˆjΠcIijt`(c)(c, pi(c))=∏
c
Pr[Xˆi = c, Xˆj = pi(c)].
=∏
c
UXˆi,Xˆj(c, pi(c))
Thus,
EXˆi,Xˆj(Mij` )=∑
pi
sgn(pi)∑
t`
bpi
=∑
t`
∑
pi
sgn(pi)bpi
=∑
t`
∑
pi
sgn(pi)∏
c
UXˆi,Xˆj(c, pi(c)) = a` det(UXˆi,Xˆj)
where a` = (∣T`∣C )C!. We finish the proof of Claim 5.2.
6 DMI-Mechanism as a Scoring Rule
DMI-Mechanism can be naturally transferred into a scoring rule. This scoring rule scores every
participant via her payment in theDMI-Mechanism. This section will show that thisDMI-Mechanism
based scoring rule scores information without ground truth, but in expectation gives scores like it
has the full knowledge of ground truth. Before the introduction of the formal setting, let’s first see
the following running example, which will help understand the formal setting.
Example 6.1 (peer grading). n students are asked to grade T a priori similar essays and the score
space is C = {good, okay, fail}. Each essay t has an unknown ground truth score gt ∈ C, which is
expensive to access. We assume that for every essay, the students’ reported scores are independent
conditioning on the essay’s ground truth score. We aim to evaluate each student’s true grading quality
without access to the ground truth scores and each student’s true grading quality should reflect the
correlation between her reported score and the ground truth score.
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Multi-task Information Evaluation We modify the multi-task information elicitation setting
by adding an unknown ground truth. For each task t, there exists an unknown ground truth signal
gt ∈ C. Before receiving task t, we denote the unknown ground truth for this task by random variable
Gt. We use U t[n],G to denote the joint distribution over all agents’ private signals and the unknown
ground truth for task t. The a priori similar assumption and the consistent strategy assumption also
extend to this setting and thus we can omit the superscript t and assume i.i.d. samples.
Assumption 6.2 (Conditional independence). We assume that agents’ private signals X1,X2,⋯Xn
are independent conditioning on G. Since agents’ strategies are independent, this also implies that
agents’ reports Xˆ1, Xˆ2,⋯Xˆn are independent conditioning on G.
With the full knowledge of ground truth G, we define the quality score of each agent i’s reported
signals by its DMI based correlation with G,
Quality(Xˆi) ∶= DMI2[Xˆi;G].
X is informative if it has a non-zero quality score. Informative information can still be very noisy
(e.g. X = G w.p. 0.01, X = 1 w.p. 0.99). We say an agent is informative if she reports informative
information. The following observation follows directly from the information-monotonicity of DMI
and justifies the reasonableness of this quality definition.
Observation 6.3. G has the highest quality score and when X ′ is less informative than X, i.e., X ′
is independent of Y conditioning X, X ′ has a lower quality score than X.
However, every information-monotone measure satisfies the above observation. The reason to
use DMI here is that we can measure the DMI based quality score without the knowledge of ground
truth (see the following theorem). This is due to the relative invariance of DMI. The traditional MI
does not have this special property.
DMI-Mechanism based scoring rule n ≥ 3 agents are assigned T ≥ 2C a priori similar tasks in
independent random orders. Agents finish the tasks without any communication. Each agent’s score
is her payment in DMI-Mechanism.
Theorem 6.4 (Information Evaluation). When T ≥ 2C and the number of informative agents is≥ 3, the difference between every two agent’s expected score in the DMI-Mechanism based scoring
rule is proportional to the difference between their quality score, i.e.,
E(pi − pj)∝ Quality(Xˆi) −Quality(Xˆj)
Moreover, by setting ∣T1∣ = ⌊T2 ⌋ and ∣T2∣ = T − ∣T1∣, for every i, and every 0 < α < κ,0 < δ < 1,
when T ≥ g(α, δ,C, κ) ∶= 4C
1−(1− α2δ
3(C!+1)(n−1)κ ) 1C where κ = maxi≠j per(UXˆi,Xˆj),
Pr[∣qi −E[qi]∣ > α] ≤ δ
where qi = norm(pi). For every two agents i, j, by setting α = ∣E[qi−qj]∣2 , when T ≥ g(α, δ2 ,C, κ), the
probability that the DMI-Mechanism based scoring rule assigns a higher score to the lower-quality
information between the two is bounded by δ, i.e.,
Pr[(pi − pj)(Quality(Xˆi) −Quality(Xˆj)) < 0] ≤ δ
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In the peer grading example, the above theorem shows that the student who has better grading
quality will also be paid more in expectation in DMI-mechanism. This property also shows the
robustness of DMI-mechanism. Note that when the number of informative agents is ≥ 3, every
agent’s rank is only related to the true quality of her information. Thus, to compare every two
agents’ information quality, the quality of other agents’ information is not important, as long as the
number of tasks is sufficiently large. Thus, we can know which student has a better grading capacity
by just looking at her payment in DMI-mechanism, when there are sufficient amount of tasks.
This section will focus on the proof of the first part of the above theorem. This part’s proof is
natural and all results almost follow directly from the relative invariance of DMI. The next section
presents the full concentration bound analysis. Note that Claim 5.2 already proved that the payment
of each agent can be written as a sum of several indicator variables. Then the analysis will follow
from a classic second moment method. The next paragraph gives some explanations for the task
complexity.
In addition to the error probability δ, the task complexity depends on the two students’ actual
grading quality difference ∣E[qi − qj]∣, the prior information κ, the score space size C and the number
of students n. κ is the maximal permanent over all joint distribution matrices. When κ is small,
the payment is more concentrated in an absolute way. When κ is zero, all agents’ payments must
always be zero and there is no need for the concentration bound. Since there exist informative
agents, κ must be > 0. The task complexity depends on n since the proof uses a union bound for all
constitutions of an agent’s payment. When all agents are informative, we can always play the game
within 3 agents and make n = 3 to decrease the task complexity.
Proof of Theorem 6.4 Part 1. For every two agent i, j, the difference between their expected pay-
ments are
E(pi − pj)=∑
k≠ia1a2DMI2(Xˆi; Xˆk) −∑k≠j a1a2DMI2(Xˆj ; Xˆk)= ∑
k≠i,j a1a2DMI2(Xˆi; Xˆk) − ∑k≠i,j a1a2DMI2(Xˆj ; Xˆk)= ∑
k≠i,j a1a2 (DMI2(Xˆi;G) −DMI2(Xˆj ;G))det(UXˆk ∣G)2 (DMI is symmetric)=(Quality(Xˆi) −Quality(Xˆj))(∑
k≠i,j a1a2 det(UXˆk ∣G)2) (DMI is relatively invariant)
When at least three informative agents exist, there must exist k ≠ i, j such that Quality(Xˆk) ≠ 0,
which also implies det(UXˆk ∣G) ≠ 0 since Quality(Xˆk) = (det(UG,G)2 det(UXˆk ∣G))2 is non-zero. Thus,(∑k≠i,j a1a2 det(UXˆk ∣G)2) ≠ 0, which implies that
E(pi − pj)∝ Quality(Xˆi) −Quality(Xˆj).
6.1 Concentration Bound Analysis
Proof of Theorem 6.4 Part 2. We first use union bound to reduce the proof to the analysis of the
concentration bound of qij = norm(det(Mij1 )det(Mij2 )) ∶= det(Mij1 )det(Mij2 )(C!)2(∣T1 ∣
C
)(∣T2 ∣
C
) and then analyze qij with
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the second moment method.
Union bound reduction First note that for every i, since qi = ∑j≠i qijn−1
Pr[∣qi −E[qi]∣ > α] ≤ Pr[∃j, ∣qij −E[qij]∣ > α] < (n − 1)max
j
Pr[∣qij −E[qij]∣ > α].
Similarly, for every two agents i, j,
Pr[(pi − pj)(Quality(Xˆi) −Quality(Xˆj)) < 0]
≤Pr[∣qi −E[qi]∣ > ∣E[qi − qj]∣
2
or ∣qj −E[qj]∣ > ∣E[qi − qj]∣
2
]
≤2 max{Pr[∣qi −E[qi]∣ > ∣E[qi − qj]∣
2
,Pr[∣qj −E[qj]∣ > ∣E[qi − qj]∣
2
}
Once we prove that when T ≥ h(α, δ,C,UXˆi,Xˆj), Pr[∣qij−E[qij]∣ > α] < δ, we will know that when
T ≥ maxi,j h(α, δn−1 ,C,UXˆi,Xˆj), Pr[∣qi−E[qi]∣ > α] < δ and when T ≥ maxi,j h( ∣E[qi−qj]∣2 , δ2(n−1) ,C,UXˆi,Xˆj),
Pr[(pi − pj)(Quality(Xˆi) −Quality(Xˆj)) < 0] < δ. Thus, it’s sufficient to only analyze the concen-
tration bound of maxj Pr[∣qij −E[qij]∣ > α].
Writing det(Mij` ) as a sum of indicator variables We fix two agents i, j here. For simplicity,
we omit the superscript ij and will add them in the end. That is, we use U to denote the joint
distribution over their reports and M1,M2 to denote their answer matrices in DMI-mechanism.
t` = (t`(1), t`(2),⋯, t`(C)) denotes ordered C distinct tasks in T` and It`(pi) ∶= ΠcIt`(c)(c, pi(c)). bpi
denotes the expectation of It`(pi) which is ΠcU(c, pi(c)), f(T,C) denotes (TC)C! and per(U) = ∑pi bpi.
The proof in Claim 5.2 shows that
detM` =∑
pi
sgn(pi) ∑
t`∈TC` It`(pi)
In the next part, we will analyze det(M`) via the second moment method in a straightforward
manner.
Analyzing det(M`) via the second moment method Without loss of generality, we only
analyze det(M1) here.
Var[detM1] =Var[∑
pi
sgn(pi)∑
t1
It1(pi)]
=∑
pi
∑
t1
Var[It1(pi)] + ∑
pi,pi′ ∑t1∩t′1≠∅Cov(It1(pi), It′1(pi′))≤∑
pi
∑
t1
bpi + ∑
pi,pi′ ∑t1∩t′1≠∅ bpi=∑
t1
(∑
pi
bpi) + ∑
pi′,t1∩t′1≠∅(∑pi bpi)=f(∣T1∣,C)per(U) +C!f(∣T1∣,C)(f(∣T1∣,C) − f(∣T1∣ −C,C))per(U)
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Which induces that
Var[ detM1
f(∣T1∣,C)] ≤ g(∣T1∣,C)per(U)
where
g(∣T1∣,C) = 1
f(∣T1∣,C) +C!(1 − f(∣T1∣ −C,C)f(∣T1∣,C) )<(C! + 1)(1 − f(∣T1∣ −C,C)
f(∣T1∣,C) )<(C! + 1)(1 − (1 − 2C∣T1∣ )C) = o(∣T1∣)
For independent X and Y ,
Var[XY ] = E[X2Y 2] − (E[XY ])2= ((E[X])2 +Var[X])((E[Y ])2 +Var[Y ]) − (E[XY ])2= Var[X]Var[Y ] +Var[X](E[Y ])2 +Var[Y ](E[X])2
then
Var[ detM1M2
f(∣T1∣,C)f(∣T2∣,C)] = Var[detM1]Var[detM1] +Var[detM1](det(U))2 +Var[detM2](det(U))2≤ g(∣T1∣,C)g(∣T2∣,C)(per(U))2 + (g(∣T1∣,C) + g(∣T2∣,C))per(U)(det(U))2
Based on Chebyshev’s inequality,
Pr[∣ detM1M2
f(∣T1∣,C)f(∣T2∣,C) − (det(U))2∣ ≥ α]≤g(∣T1∣,C)g(∣T2∣,C)(per(U))2 + (g(∣T1∣,C) + g(∣T2∣,C))per(U)(det(U))2
α2
Then when g(∣T`∣,C) < α2δ3per(U) , Pr[∣ detM1M2f(∣T1∣,C)f(∣T2∣,C) − (det(U))2∣ ≥ α] < δ
Note that g(∣T`∣,C) < (C! + 1)(1 − (1 − 2C∣T1∣)C), then we can pick ∣Tl∣ > 2C1−(1− α2δ
3per(U)(C!+1) )1/C to
make g(∣T`∣,C) < α2δ3per(U) . Thus, we can pick T > h(α, δ,C,UXˆi,Xˆj) ∶= 4C1−(1− α2δ
3per(U
Xˆi,Xˆj
)(C!+1) )1/C (we
put back the superscript ij) to make Pr[∣qij −E[qij]∣ > α] < δ. To maximize over all i, j, we just pick
κ = maxi≠j per(UXˆi,Xˆj). Based on the analysis in the union bound reduction part, we finish the
proof.
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7 Conclusion and Discussion
This paper proposes the first dominantly truthful and the first detail-free informed-truthful multi-task
peer prediction mechanism, DMI-Mechanism, that only requires a finite number of tasks. In fact,
DMI-Mechanism only requires a small constant number of tasks. Additionally, the mechanism is
detail-free, minimal, works for non-common heterogenous priors and only requires ≥ 2 participants.
When there are ≥ 3 informative participants, DMI-Mechanism can also be used as a scoring rule
that scores information without knowledge of ground truth. The construction of the mechanism is
based on a new information measure, DMI.
For clean analysis, the information elicitation part’s analysis is restricted to the setting where
agents do not need to expend effort to receive their private information. In the setting where agents
incur a cost for putting forth the effort required to obtain their private signal, DMI-Mechanism still
applies straightforwardly and all truthfulness properties are preserved when the analysis is restricted
to the signal-report strategies. However, to incentivize efforts, each agent needs to believe at least a
certain number of other agents will invest effort.
The current implementation of the mechanism asks the agents to perform the same T tasks,
while it’s fine to ask the agents to perform different tasks as long as each agent has ≥ 2C overlapping
tasks with other agents. With this extension, each task does not need to be performed by all agents
and thus the efficiency of the mechanism will increase.
An interesting direction is to perform real-world experiments and use DMI-Mechanism to recover
unknown ground truth. A full classification of dominantly truthful mechanisms with a small number
of tasks is another interesting theoretic direction. This problem can be reduced to the search
for information measures that have the polynomial format. Moreover, DMI’s weakness is that it
cannot measure the correlation between random variables that have supports of different sizes. The
investigation of the existence of the mechanism that can overcome this weakness and preserve all
other properties is also a possible direction.
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A Additional proof
Fact A.1. For every square transition matrix T, ∣det(T)∣ ≤ 1 and the equality holds if and only if
T is a permutation matrix.
The above fact can be implied by Perron-Frobenius theorem [15] and here we present a direct
and basic proof.
Proof. Since a matrix’s determinant equals its transpose’s determinant, without loss of generality,
we assume T is row-stochastic, i.e., every row sums to 1. A matrix A is sub-row-stochastic if its all
elements are in [0, 1] and every row’s sum is less than 1. We will show a slightly stronger result: for
every square sub-row-stochastic matrix A, ∣det(A)∣ ≤ 1 and the equality holds iff A is a permutation
matrix. This result implies the fact and is easy to be proved by induction with respect to the matrix
dimension C.
When C = 1, the result holds naturally. For C > 1, when the result holds for C − 1, first note that
∣det(A)∣ =∣∑
j
(−1)j+1a1,j det(A−1,−j)∣
≤∑
j
a1,j ∣det(A−1,−j)∣
where a1,j is the jth element of A’s first row and A−1,−j is A’s minor that deletes the first row
and the jth column.
Since every minor is also sub-row-stochastic and the result holds for C − 1, we have
∣det(A)∣ ≤∑
j
a1,j ∣det(A−1,−j)∣ ≤∑
j
a1,j ≤ 1
When ∣det(A)∣ = 1, ∑i a1,j = 1 and for all j′ that a1,j′ > 0, ∣det(A−1,−j′)∣ = 1, which implies
that A−1,−j′ is a permutation matrix (recall that the result holds for C − 1). We pick j0 such that
a1,j0 > 0. Since A−1,−j0 is a permutation matrix, due to the fact that A is sub-row-stochastic, for all
i ≠ 1, ai,j0 must be zero. Then for all j ≠ j0, det(A−1,−j) must be zero since it has all zero column.
Thus a1,j0 must be one to make ∣det(A)∣ = 1. The fact that A is sub-row-stochastic implies that
a1,j = 0,∀j ≠ j0. Therefore, A must be a permutation matrix to make ∣det(A)∣ = 1.
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